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Aspects of below-replacement fertility have long been debated among academics.
Analyzing 437 popular newspaper and magazine articles from eleven developed
countries during 1998-99, this study describes the corresponding public debate about
low fertility. Despite the diversity in the national debates of the eleven countries due
to different socioeconomic, political and demographic backgrounds, our study finds
important commonalties among the public debates about low fertility: First, countries
emphasize consequences and potential interventions rather than causes in their public
debate over low fertility. Second, our study reveals that the popular press discusses
low fertility as a serious concern with mostly negative implications, despite the fact
that many of the causes of low fertility are associated with social and economic
progress. Third, the variety of issues and perspectives revealed in the public debate,
while cohesive in general ways, invites a role for demographers in informing an
accurate public discussion of low fertility, which will help form the most appropriate
policy outcomes.2
1. Introduction
Low fertility has become quite commonplace worldwide, and Europe has experienced
below replacement fertility for several decades. Yet, total fertility rates that approach
levels of 1.0, as they do in Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, and other Eastern European
countries, or total fertility rates that are even below 1.0, as in eastern Germany and
parts of Italy, are a relatively new phenomenon. This decline in birth rates did not
pass demographers unnoticed; they initiated substantial new interest about the
possible endpoints of the fertility decline and the relation of current fertility trends to
socioeconomic conditions. In addition to demographers’ interest in low fertility, the
rapid and sometimes extreme changes in fertility patterns in the last decade moved the
issue of low fertility beyond professional conferences and communications into the
public forum. Emerging is not only an active public debate about the causes and
consequences of low fertility levels, but also a shift in the public conscience from
alarm over too many people to fears of too few.
This evolution begs the question of how the recent public debate over low fertility is
framed in various countries. This paper seeks to describe which causes and
consequences of low fertility feature most prominently in public debates; which
causes and consequences are emphasized in the corresponding academic debate;
which interventions towards changing or accommodating the recent trends are favored
in the popular press; and what public opinion towards low fertility implies for policy
interventions. Understanding how low fertility is debated in the popular press is not
only interesting in its own right, but it is also essential knowledge for demographers
in order to contribute actively to both the popular debate on low fertility and also the3
debate on public policy reactions. When demographers can draw on professional
knowledge about the measurements, determinants and implications of below-
replacement fertility and also cultivate an awareness of the public perception of low
fertility, they will succeed in contributing to the public debate on low fertility and the
corresponding debate in the public policy arena. Participating in the sometimes
erroneously framed and incompletely informed public debate will aid in appropriately
adjusting or reshaping policies in order to change or accommodate the recent
developments.
In this paper we therefore describe patterns in how countries attribute the causes and
consequences of low fertility, and the expressed concerns and “fears” in the recent
public debate over contemporary low fertility. These investigations are based on the
popular press—that is, leading national or regional newspapers or magazines, of
eleven developed countries. Admittedly, the popular press blurs some nuances of
public conscience and is only a partial representation of the public debate about low
fertility. However, in comparing public discourse across the breadth of four
continents, the popular press can be a useful resource with valuable insights. In a
similar study that motivated and inspired our investigations, Wilmoth and Ball (1992)
analyze the development of public perceptions of population issues, particularly
pertaining to population growth, as represented in American popular magazines. They
argue that the popular literature serves as a valuable means for analyzing the structure
of population arguments, which create a cultural climate influencing policy decisions
and intellectual debate. Likewise, social science communication research shows that
mass media creates, what Rogers and Storey call, “awareness-knowledge” among the
public and stimulates further interpersonal discussion about an issue (1995).4
1.1 Professional debate over low fertility
Before we embark on the analyses of the public debate about low fertility, some
recent developments in the corresponding professional debate among demographers
are worth emphasizing. An intensive review of the literature on low fertility is far
beyond the scope of the present paper, and the following presentation is partial and
influenced by our own research in that area.
It has been known for quite some time that replacement fertility, which is appealing in
terms of population dynamics since it implies a long-term stationary population,
constitutes only an “implausible endpoint of the demographic transition” (Demeny
1997a) and is not necessarily an attractor for future fertility trends. In their analyses of
sustained below replacement fertility in Europe, demographers therefore frequently
refer to the Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe 1983; van de Kaa 1987) that
describes a long-term and irreversible transformation of demographic behavior
towards low fertility levels, greater individualism and more diverse partnership and
fertility patterns. In addition, economic incentives and labor market conditions,
especially for young adults, provide an important aspect in demographers’ approaches
to explaining low fertility (Hotz et al. 1997; Macunovich 1996), although recent
evidence suggests that some of the primary relations between female labor market
participation and unemployment have been subject to substantial changes. In
particular, high fertility in cross-sectional analyses with developed countries tends to
be associated with high female labor force participation during the 1990s, quite
contrary to the reverse pattern during earlier decades (Ahn and Mira 1998; Hoem
1999; Rindfuss et al. 2000). Exemplary for this reversal are for example Italy and5
Spain, both characterized by relatively low female labor force participation and
fertility, while the United States and Nordic countries tend to have achieved both
relatively high fertility levels (as compared with European countries) and female
participation in the labor market. Differential family policies across these countries
may be an important factor in these fertility developments and its relation to labor
market behavior (Demeny 1997b; Gauthier 1996; Hoem and Hoem 1990). Still, more
research is necessary to fully understand the effect of these different policies.
In addition to the debate about the above determinants of low fertility, the recent
introduction of the adjusted total fertility rate has also caused an active academic
debate about whether the quantum of contemporary fertility is actually above the level
suggested by the total fertility rate and whether concerns about low fertility may be
exaggerated because the commonly used demographic measures are distorted due to
tempo effects (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Kohler and Philipov 2001; Lesthaeghe
and Willems 1999). Furthermore, demographers have started to explore the potential
limits of low fertility arising from either socio-demographic constraints (Golini
1998b; Namboodiri and Wei 1997) or evolutionary or genetic predispositions for
having children (Foster 2000; Kohler et al. 1999). In addressing the question “Why
have children in the 21
st Century?” Morgan and King (2001) assess a broad range of
potential social, economic and biological incentives to have children and conclude
biological predispositions supported by a pronatalist context could result in a set of
rational decisions that produce moderately high fertility near replacement level.
However, the authors are not necessarily optimistic that policy-makers will succeed
(or want to succeed) in establishing such a suitable pronatalist context that facilitates
higher fertility. In particular, Morgan and King raise doubts that countries with6
current lowest-low fertility levels, such as Italy, will sufficiently change the
socioeconomic context of fertility and propose that very low fertility may not merely
be a transitory phenomenon in these countries.
The demographic consequences of such sustained below-replacement fertility are well
known to demographers (e.g., Coale 1986; Espenshade 1986; Heer 1986; Lee 1994,
2000; McNicoll 1986; Teitelbaum 1997; Weil 1997) and include an aging and
possibly shrinking of the population and the labor force. These developments then
pose problems to pension and related public support systems, lead potentially to
shortages in the labor market and fewer “geniuses,” shift political influence towards
the elderly, and reduce the long-term innovation and economic growth of populations.
Many of these changes are perceived negatively by demographers, and Alfred Sauvy
(cited in Coale 1986, p. 214) described a stationary population as a population of old
people ruminating over old ideas in old houses. While many of these pessimistic
assessments of low fertility are realistic and quite plausible in our opinion, some of
the above consequences deserve more careful empirical investigations. Quite
unanimous, however, seems to be the consensus among demographers that moderate
levels of immigration will do little to curtail population aging, and to a lesser extent,
the long-term reduction in population size associated with fertility levels that are
substantially below replacement levels.
In addition, low fertility can also imply positive consequences. Individuals experience
benefits if being a member of a small cohort improves access to labor market,
education, and housing opportunities, as Easterlin (1980) argued. Moreover,
continued low fertility also implies a reversal of the arguments that lead to fears about7
population growth (for example, see Erhlich and Lui 1997). In particular, capital
deepening in below replacement populations—in contrast to the capital widening in
growing populations—can have positive impacts on labor market productivity and
economic growth.
The specific literature on the implications of lowest low fertility, i.e., of total fertility
rates that are below 1.3, is still relatively few. In part, the implications of lowest low
fertility are extensions of the above demographic work on below replacement fertility
and also recent work on population aging (for example, Lee 2000; Martin and Preston
1994). An additional dimension of very low fertility levels, however, arises from a
“fear of population decline” (Teilelbaum and Winter 1985, 1998) that is concentrated
on non-economic concerns about the size and composition of the population.
1.2 Public debate over low fertility in context
The public debate over low fertility reflects some of the above diversity in the
academic debate. This investigation in eleven countries across four continents reflects
a broad range of fertility experiences, and it reveals considerable variation in public
debates over low fertility. We see this variation as caused by two elements: broad
clusters of variation based on a country’s demographic experience and additional
variation based on a country’s policy climate.
First, a country’s demographic experience—the extent it is below replacement level,
the duration it has remained below replacement level, and the speed with which it fell
below replacement level—explains broad variations in concern over low fertility. For
example, Spain and Japan, which have been at lowest-low levels for years, cluster8
away from other countries that have not experienced very low fertility for very long,
like the US.
Second, different policy climates may explain some cross-country variations in
concern over low fertility. Most countries included in our study have implemented
policies or are initiating discussions to combat shrinking labor forces, squeezed social
security funds and deteriorating attitudes towards parenting (Zoubanov 2000). Most
notably, France has maintained a pro-natalist family policy for decades, offering both
financial support and services for parents. In Germany, family policy is framed as
liberal non-intervention: policies serve to allow couples the freedom to chose between
work and parenting as they see fit. In contrast, Italy has rushed to implement policy to
reduce state imposed financial burdens on parents as raising children has become
more expensive. Similarly, amidst high costs of raising children and cultural sanctions
on combining work and mothering, Japan has passed laws ensuring greater gender
equity and improved public day-care facilities (Zoubanov 2000).
The effectiveness, zeal and consensus with which governments make these policy
changes or invite discussion explain some variation in public perceptions of low
fertility. As Zoubanov (2000) writes based on the UN Population Policy Data Bank,
“Government policies do not always match their satisfaction with demographic
parameters.” This disjoint between perception and policy creates space for public
discussion. Illustrating this point, table 1 provides a view of government perceptions
of their countries’ demographic situations and their corresponding policy efforts.9
What we find most interesting is that despite this cross-country diversity in
demographic experience and policy climate described above, the public debates on
low fertility reflect some broad similarities. First, countries emphasize consequences
and potential interventions rather than causes in their public debate over low fertility.
Second, the public press perceives low fertility as a serious concern with mostly
negative implications, despite the fact that many of the causes of low fertility are
associated with social and economic progress. Third, the variety of issues and
perspectives revealed in the public debate, while cohesive in general ways, invites a
role for demographers in informing an accurate public discussion of low fertility,
which will help form the most appropriate policy outcomes.
In the following section we first describe our methodology for searching, identifying
and coding articles discussing low fertility in the popular press. We then consider the
intensity and overall perspective of the low fertility debate in the eleven countries of
our study. Subsequently we consider separately the specific causes, consequences and
policy interventions that are suggested in the popular debate about low fertility.
Finally, we describe in more detail the public debates in the United States, Italy and
New Zealand, which are representative of three distinct patterns of debate and
concern that emerge from our quantitative analysis.
2. Methodology
Articles from eleven countries were analyzed over a two-year period. All countries
selected have a TFR under 2.1, and they were chosen to represent a range of
demographic experiences, geographic locations and depths of societal concern over
low fertility. In addition, only developed countries yielding at least nine relevant10
articles between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1999 in our press database were
considered to ensure a thorough representation of the recent debate over a two-year
span. The countries meeting these criteria include Australia, Austria, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, and
The United States. Other countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Ireland,
Netherlands, Russia, and Sweden, were considered but excluded because no
substantial low-fertility debate materialized in the national press. It would be
interesting to explore popular press coverage in countries where low fertility debates
did not materialize. However, we think that the absence of debate in the countries we
excluded only indicates country-specific access limitations of our database; that is, the
potential debate in these seven excluded countries could not be thoroughly accessed
through our press database described below.
Current events invariably influence the issues covered in the popular press. Still, this
analysis covers a two-year time period, which gives ample time to glean a sense of
enduring medium- and long-term issues rather than journalistic capriciousness. At the
same time, the time period offers the most recent snapshot of contemporary low
fertility debates. Inclusion of other media, like television and radio, would have been
beyond the means of this project. Furthermore, we are satisfied that the analysis of all
articles included in our sources during this time gives us a well-defined group to study
systematically. By analyzing articles from several newspapers and magazines for each
country, we build a representative set of articles and avoid overstating the case of a
few personalities or publication policies. In addition, we chose articles from regional
as well as nation sources to thoroughly represent the range of issues low fertility
raises.11
In order to identify and retrieve articles discussing low fertility in the media we
accessed national and major regional presses of the above eleven countries through
the Reuters Business Briefings (RBB) press database. This database catalogues
newspapers and some magazines, most in their entirety (exceptions frequently are
recipes, letters to the editor, etc.). It offered the most comprehensive, searchable
agglomeration of international popular press articles over two years that we could
access. Our analyses were restricted to newspapers and magazines that are defined as
national or regional presses in the RBB database, thus weeding out newswires’
uncertain readership and trade publications’ financial-news bias. A list of all
newspapers and magazines included in our search is given in the appendix. A more
detailed description of the service and a list of all sources catalogued in the RBB
database are available at http://www.reuters.com.
The titles, abstracts and complete article texts (where available) of the sources were
searched in English, as well as the country’s native language if it is not English,
including French, German, Italian, and/or Spanish, for articles discussing low
fertility.
1 Swiss sources were searched in English, French and German. Search terms
included: in English: low fertility, low birth rate, low birthrate, below replac*, birth
dearth; in French: fécondité and natalité; in German: Geburtenrckgang,
Bevlkerungsrckgang; in Italian: fecondit*, natalit*; and in Spanish: baja
                                                
1 Thanks to Laura Bernardi for Italian translating, Annette Baudisch for German translating, Erin Sines
and Raúl Guerra Alonso for Spanish translating, and Nancy Heely for French translating. The foreign
language quotes included in the article were translated by these five speakers. In addition, most non-12
fecundidad, baja natalidad.
2 Japanese sources were searched in English only. We
recognize the limitations of finding equivalent search terms in five languages and that
some relevant articles were excluded using narrow search terms. However, after
extensive trial searching, our method identified the vast majority of low-fertility
articles while picking up the fewest irrelevant articles. Some countries, like Germany,
developed specific vocabularies for low fertility, which allowed narrow search terms.
Other countries, like Spain, did not develop specific vocabularies, thus requiring more
broad searching and hand weeding of articles. For all countries, irrelevant articles
were culled out, including those discussing low or lower fertility in above-
replacement settings, low fertility in an inappropriate context (like low soil fertility),
and low fertility as a historical trend followed by a rebound with no mention of
contemporary low fertility (for example, some US articles only discussed below
replacement fertility in the 1970s followed by a fertility rebound in reference to the
current labor market). We did include articles discussing low fertility among cultural
or ethnic groups in low fertility settings (like Scots in the UK or Jews in the US). And
we also analyzed articles discussing low fertility of regions (like Europe or
“developed countries”) within a broader text about the world or regions not
necessarily experiencing low fertility.
Table 2 provides summary statistics about the articles identified by our search strategy
in the respective source countries, the countries where the newspapers or magazines
are issued. Our search identified a total of 437 relevant articles, ranging from
                                                                                                                                           
English articles were read with a translator and Laura Stark, which allowed for coding validation and
consistency.
2 Search terms ending with an asterisk were recognized in the articles with any word ending.13
countries with 9 articles (Switzerland) to 74 (Australia). The second column reports
the number of articles by source and therefore standardizes for the fact that the
number of newspapers and magazines included in our database differ for each
country. Measured by this indicator, the most active debates about low fertility occur
in Italy and France, while the US and New Zealand have the smallest number of low
fertility articles per source. Since some newspapers and magazines may not engage at
all in the debate about low fertility, we also standardize the total number of articles by
the number of sources with at least one article about low fertility (column 3). This
measure for intensity of the low fertility debate also reveals that the most active
debate occurs in Italy and that the five countries with the most active debates are
represented by Italy, France, Austria, Japan, and Australia. The US and New Zealand
emerge again as two countries with relatively little public debate on low fertility.
3. Coding
The articles identified in our press search were first coded for descriptive
characteristics, as for instance: the country that the article comes from; the country,
region, or group that the article discusses; and the article date. In addition to the
eleven countries used as sources, the discussion has been coded as focusing on the
world, developed countries, Scotland, Christians, Jews, Hispanics/Latinos, or Greek
Orthodox. Articles discussing low fertility of a specific industrialized country that did
not result in a set large enough to analyze (like Norway, Russia, and Canada) were
included under “developed countries” as the debate area. Articles discussing an
agglomeration of low fertility countries (for example Spain and Italy), as well as those
debating Europe’s low fertility were coded as discussing “developed countries” as14
well. The TFR, growth rate, and natural increase of the source country and the
country, region, or group discussed were also coded.
Two other general indicators were also recorded—how the article defines low fertility
and the article’s overall perspective towards low fertility. Though we disregarded the
accuracy of the fertility measures used in the articles, it is worth noting that all articles
defined low fertility either by a TFR, by another demographic measure (for example,
the crude birth rate), or by a general phrase/no specific definition. No article made
attempts to distinguish between cohort and period fertility measures or included a
reference to potential distortions of these fertility measures by tempo effects
(Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Articles that used general phrases to define low fertility
often spoke of below replacement fertility, or simply used the assumption that low
fertility was common knowledge, requiring no measured proof.
Next, individual arguments were coded that answered three specific questions: What
causes low fertility?; What are the consequences of low fertility?; and What
should/can be done about low fertility? Articles could cite more than one argument or
give no argument for each question. Articles were analyzed for positive, neutral, or
negative discussion of causes and consequences. Arguments offering equally positive
and negative perspectives were coded as neutral. In addition, our coding included the
discussion of what will be done about low fertility, assertions of what should be done,
and descriptions of what is being done. The coding of these interventions
distinguished between measures that are aimed at changing low fertility as opposed to
those aimed as accommodating low fertility.15
4. Overall perspective and geographic focus of the low-fertility debate
Articles’ overall perspectives—either positive, negative, or neutral—were more than a
culmination of perspectives on specific issues. The overall perspective included the
less tangible tone of the article—most importantly, word choice. Articles often
avoided taking sides on arguments or offered a balanced perspective on specific
causes or consequences of low fertility. However, many used words to describe low
fertility with either negative connotations, like crisis, fear, or threat or positive
connotations, like progress or victory. These subtleties were reflected in the overall
perspective code. Although this classification of an article’s overall perspective on
low fertility was based on a subjective assessment, the perspective in most cases was
relatively apparent and easy to classify.
Despite the relatively broad range of demographic, geographic and socioeconomic
contexts that are represented by the different countries in our study, the overall
perspectives of the articles on low fertility are mostly negative (62 percent) and
otherwise mostly neutral (33 percent). Table 3 shows that across all countries, less
than 5 percent of articles identify low fertility as a positive phenomenon, and many of
these articles with a positive evaluation consider environmental or ecological
consequences.
3
                                                
3 In all tables, averages are calculated based on the total number of articles, rather than weighing each
country’s or argument’s distribution equally.16
A quite noticeable divergence across the above countries, however, exists with respect
to the consensus on a negative overall perspective. The public opinion in Japan, New
Zealand and Spain, as measured by the articles identified in our search, is
overwhelmingly negative regarding low fertility with more than 80 percent of all
articles having a negative perspective. On the other hand, 50 percent or less of all
articles express such a negative perspective in France and the US. The prevalence of
these negative or positive perspectives on low fertility is graphed against the total
fertility rate in Figure 1. Japan and most European countries are in the top left part of
the graph and thus share a relatively low fertility and a relatively negative perspective
on low fertility. Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, do have a relatively
high fertility as compared to the European countries, but share their generally
negative perspective. The United States in this graph represents the country with the
highest total fertility rate and a perspective on low fertility that is quite balanced
between negative and neutral/positive. France is clearly an outsider among the
European countries, and it is the only country in which most articles reflect a neutral
overall perspective on low fertility in our data.
The public debate on low fertility does not have to be concentrated on the country in
which the newspaper or magazine is based. In particular, the geographic focus of the
debate about low fertility may be an interesting aspect of the debate itself. In Table 4
we therefore tabulate the country or geographic area on which articles focus for the
eleven source countries. The most striking observation of this table is that the debate
about low fertility seems to be primarily a domestic concern. The vast majority of
articles in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and Spain are
concerned with low fertility in the respective countries. Within Europe, only the17
United Kingdom and Switzerland have a low fertility debate that significantly extends
beyond national borders. In both countries, the non-national debate is quite evenly
spread across other European and developed countries without an outward focus on
one particular country. In terms of its geographic orientation, the US debate seems to
be quite similar to the debate in the UK with a relatively broad focus on other
developed countries. This outward focus dominates press coverage in the US and the
UK, despite the two countries being the only ones in which low fertility of a minority
group or ethnic group receives some attention.
5. The causes of low fertility in the popular debate
Unlike the increasing discussion among demographers about the causes of low
fertility, relatively little of the low fertility debate in the media is concerned with the
causes of low or declining fertility rates. In the eleven countries included in this study,
only about one third of all articles mention at least one cause of low fertility (Table 5).
The extent to which causal interpretations are made in the respective debates varies
considerably. In our data, only 10 percent of all articles in Japan mention a specific
cause of low fertility, while almost 82 percent of all articles in Spain relate low
fertility to a specific cause.
We additionally investigated the specific causes of low fertility that were mentioned
in the respective national debates in the popular media. In particular, we coded for the
following causes of low fertility and additionally one ‘other’ category for all causes
that did not fit into the categories below.18
Changing role of women: Opportunities for women in the workforce or for more life
choices are cited as causes under this argument. Feminist vocabulary, describing more
opportunity for women, characterize positive views. However, the changing role of
women is also described in a negative tone often using traditionalist ideas. Asahi
Shimbun explains changing roles in Japan, “The low birth rate is partly attributed to a
growing number of women working and marrying later than previous generations.
Many women say they would like to get married and have children but are reluctant to
do so because a modern marriage has little to offer them.”
Economics: This argument is strongly polarized. Some view a strong economy as a
disincentive for parenting, arguing that potential parents chose work and wealth over
marriage and childbearing. “Turbo-capitalism is not providing the conditions in which
young women and men want to get married,” said a Melbourne Age (Australia)
article.
4 In addition, stay-at-home parents or caretaker grandparents—important
people in prolific societies—are pulled into the workforce because of labor shortages,
according to some. On the contrary, a weak economy is also blamed for a sense of
insecurity among youth and families, leading to fewer births. The cover article in the
August 30, 1999 issue of Germany’s Der Spiegel explains:
Children as a burden, whose arrival makes life difficult; or as a luxury, that
people cannot or don’t want to afford, children as costs. It rings
paradoxically—although Germany is one of the richest countries in the world,
economic reasons are mainly responsible for the baby gap…When the
population shrinks, demand and, with it, investments shrink. Income and
                                                
4 October 12, 199919
employment decrease or grow more slowly. In turn, investments shrink
further—the beginning of a downward spiral.
Contraceptive knowledge: People know more about preventing pregnancies, and more
contraceptive methods are available than in past decades. Progressives, often
including young people and feminists, take positive perspectives towards this cause of
low fertility, while traditionalists take more negative perspectives. Abortion is also
included as a contraceptive issue. As an article in The Australian, date April 21, 1999,
states, “The causes of the [fertility] decline are well known…” including “…effective
contraception and access to abortion.”
Government or employer family policies: Financial and time incentives and
disincentives influence childbearing decisions. Regardless of policy motivations,
governments and employers influence individual fertility decisions. An article in
Austria’s Die Presse
5 says that residents are, “having continually fewer
children…Criticism of this state of affairs falls on the fact that residents get too little
government child support and that women find it very hard to reconcile work and
family…Women with more children hardly have a chance to return to their careers.”
Social or cultural attitudes: Burgeoning attitudes among potential parents and people
influential to them impact fertility decisions. An article in France’s Les Echos
6 takes a
neutral perspective on the link between contemporary attitudes and low fertility:
“Fertility is largely influenced by the ideas that individuals have about families,”
                                                
5 February 23, 199920
particularly their conception of ideal family size. But attitudes like selfishness and
materialism are commonly cited in a negative tone, as this quote from the Australian
Financial Review
7 exemplifies, “Children are an irritant to urban lifestyles, so it’s not
surprising that the most common family in Australia today is one that doesn’t have
any dependent children…”
Financial costs of having children: The expense of bearing, raising, and schooling
children, especially as they leave parental homes later, causes low fertility. An article
in Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun
8 states the argument clearly, “There is no doubt that
married couples chose to have fewer children due to the financial burden of
childcare.” An article in Spain’s Cinco Dias
9 summarizes the low fertility paradox of
many Mediteranian countries: “Survivorship of cohesive families facilitates many
young people to live longer in the parental home…which radically increases the cost
of having children.” Understandably, financial costs were most often regarded
negatively.
Table 5 also tabulates the frequency with which these specific causes of low fertility
are mentioned in the public debate about low fertility. The percentages in the table
gives the proportion of article that mention a specific cause among all articles that
include at least one specific factor. (More than one cause of low fertility can be
mentioned in each article.) Social causes of low fertility, namely the changing role
                                                                                                                                           
6 July 8, 1999
7 August 14, 1999
8 November 11, 1999
9 October 22, 199921
women and cultural attitudes, are featured most prominently in the popular press. For
instance, in Japan every article that includes causal explanations of low fertility also
mentions the changing role of women, and more than one out of four articles does so
in the remaining countries. Cultural attitudes is most consistently mentioned in
articles across all countries as the cause of low fertility, with the exception of New
Zealand. Attitudes like selfishness and material reverie are commonly mentioned
among these causes, as well as the incompatibility of children with desired and highly
esteemed urban and flexible lifestyles.
While the specific economic aspects related to the costs of children received no
particular emphasis, the economic situation in general—a broad range of factors
encompassing increasing female labor force participation, increasing job insecurity,
material opportunities provided in modern economies, and the like—is mentioned in
about one out of five articles. This emphasis seems to be quite common to all the
debates about low fertility. Family policies, that is, the financial and policy
motivations provided by governments and employers for families, feature prominently
in some national debates, as in Austria and to a lesser extent in Japan, Italy and
Australia. Interestingly, a family policy debate is absent in the Germany, where many
demographers attribute low fertility to deficiencies of the day-care and public support
system (e.g., see Kreyenfeld and Hank 2001).
Quite surprisingly is also that contraceptive knowledge and financial costs of children
do not feature prominently among these causes, except for Japan and France, where
debates surround the impact of the pill, and New Zealand, where a strong abortion
debate developed in reference to low fertility.22
Another reading of table 5 across countries also reveals some interesting absences of
specific causes in various national debates that are worth mentioning. The causes in
the New Zealand discussion, for instance, frequently do not fall into any of the above
categories, aside from the contraceptive knowledge cause stemming from an
underlying debate on abortion. Although Austria has an active debate about family
policies (e.g., Hoem et al. 1999), the specific aspect of child costs—which refers to
direct child costs since the notion of opportunity costs is not strongly emphasized in
the public debate—does not feature prominently. In the United States, on the other
hand, neither the changing role of women, family policies, contraceptive knowledge,
nor financial costs receive a strong focus. In particular, the absence of the child-cost
argument is striking since in comparison with many European countries the US has
probably the least subsidies for day care, schooling and higher education, and other
important aspects of child costs (Gauthier 1996). At the same time, with the highest
total fertility rate among the eleven countries in our study, the American public is
probably least concerned with promoting childbearing.
Table 6 reiterates the prominence of social causes of low fertility in national debates.
The changing role of women is mentioned as a cause in 15 percent of all articles and
cultural attitudes is mentioned in 14 percent, making them the two most commonly
cited causes. Interestingly, these two most common causes making up a “social cause”
frame are split regarding perspectives towards them. While one fifth of all articles
view the changing role of women as a positive development, second only to better
contraceptive knowledge (25 percent positive), the cultural attitudes leading to low
fertility are portrayed as negative more than half of the time. Still, the divide between23
social and economic/logistical causes of low fertility seen in table 5 extends to table 6.
The three factors causing low fertility most often covered in a negative light are
family policies (81 percent), financial costs (80 percent) and economics (59 percent).
6. The consequences of low fertility in the popular debate
The debate about low fertility in the popular press seems to be more substantially
concerned with the consequences of low fertility, rather than the causes of low
fertility, both for individuals and for society at large. On average about two thirds of
all articles mentioned at least one consequence, ranging from 36 percent (New
Zealand) to 80 percent (United States), as shown in Table 7. (Again, articles could
cite more than one consequence of low fertility.) The three countries with the most
frequent discussion of low fertility consequences are the United States, the United
Kingdom and Germany, while New Zealand, Austria and Italy the have the least
representation of potential consequences of low fertility in their public debates.
Similar to our above investigation of low fertility causes in the public debate, we
disaggregate the debate about the consequences in nine main topics:
The economy, labor force, or pension system: This triad of consequences is closely
linked, and therefore coded together. They also have a wide range of seemingly
contradictory perspectives. Some articles herald low fertility in boosting the economy
and curbing unemployment. Yet, others state that fewer consumers and labor24
shortages will destroy the current economic system, like this Washington Post
10
article about Germany:
Having one of the world’s lowest birthrates also threatens Germany’s future.
Soon, one in five Germans will be retired and drawing a large pension, yet the
imploding demographic pattern—coupled with an aversion to accepting more
immigrants—means that a much small core of working people will support
them.
National well-being: This patriotic argument asserts that low fertility has
repercussions on a national level. The source of nations’ general senses of spirit and
vigor is weighed in these arguments. Negative arguments frame a shrinking
population as a loss of vitality. Articles predicting the disappearance of a group—
most popularly, the vanishing of the Japanese population in a given number of
centuries if the country’s demographics remain constant—is a common scenario in
this argument, like this section from The Melbourne Age (Australia): “If present very
low birth rates of the Japanese continues for just 200 years, there will be no Japanese
people left.”  Other articles expressed nationalistic concerns about their own countries
such as The Independent 
11 (UK): “The fertility rate, 3.5 in 1901, is now down to 1.8
and falling, below replacement level. Which may be okay for the future of the
universe but isn’t good news for the nation. We lose our brightest and best.” This
quote recites a common Australian theme
12: “This is a truly pathetic result for
Australia. It indicates not a national development mentality, but a mindset which has
                                                
10 October 3, 1999
11 August 22, 1998
12 The Australian; May 9, 199825
accepted that Australia is already in late middle age; a senescent society already in
terminal decline, its years of vigor and growth all past.” Although our analysis below
will show that such negative concerns about the implications of low fertility on the
national well-being dominate in the public debate, a few articles also welcome “fewer
quality people” as the base of a quality nation.
Power distribution: Threats to power—both physical and political—can be
felt on a regional and international level because of low fertility (Teitelbaum and
Winter 1985, 1998). The prospect of a declining population size is viewed as a threat
for some nations equating human numbers with power. An Australian
13 article titled
“No Real Future without Body of Inhabitants”, said low fertility will result in
“…pressure from crowded neighboring countries and a declining say in world
affairs.” Likewise, low fertility is often perceived as changing regional power
distributions, which disrupt the balance within nations. For example, heated articles
from the United Kingdom debate the validity of re-distributing seats in parliament
because of the declining number of Scots. The Scotsman
14 quotes one expert as
saying, “Scottish low fertility is distinct in its lowness…We are all dying out, but the
Scots are dying out faster than others. This raised the political question of how much
representation a dying breed deserves.” A changing power distribution is usually seen
as either positive or negative, depending on the author’s allegiance.
The ecological environment: This classic issue in population debates (e.g., Clarke
1996) is most often discussed in a positive tone. Regardless of the numbers, the fewer
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the people, the better the environment, as this Melbourne Age (Australia)
15 article
illustrates, “…for some environmentalists, for whom there can scarcely ever be too
few humans, this is good news.”
Women, parents, or families: Low fertility impacts individuals or family members on
a personal level. Individuals’ lifestyles are different than they would be with any
children or with more children. Laura Balbo, Italy’s Equal Opportunity Minister,
frames this consequence of low fertility in a positive light in a La Stampa
16 article
saying, “More women have time for politics since they are not so busy raising so
many children.”
Family structure: This consequence impacts an institution, rather than individuals.
The article’s impression of family structure—as it is or as it should be—is changed by
low fertility. The Economist
17 reported that due to low fertility, “A more subtle but
equally profound change will be in the structure of the family. The chances are that
today’s 6 billionth child will enjoy two or three siblings, a bevy of adoring aunts and
uncles, a clutch of cousins. Baby number 7,500,000,000 is more likely to be an only
child, with few relatives of her own generation.” Similarly, an article in the Swiss
Neue Zricher Zeitung titled, “Germany: The Alarm Call of Demographers,” says that
low fertility causes “worry about structural changes in the area of the family. An
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increasingly individualistic lifestyle disintegrates traditional family connections even
more.”
Social structure or attitudes: Low fertility changes a variety of cultural senses, by
incorporating new multicultural influences, for example, or redefining the age
mentality of a culture. Upon stating that low fertility will create “quite a different type
of society from today”, The Independent
18 author expanded, “What politicians need to
think about is the impact an aging electorate will have on social attitudes. An older
population will inevitably have different ideas about how a society should be
organized from a younger one. Call these ‘Bournemouth values,’ for want of a better
expression: a desire for a more orderly society.”
Infrastructure: Low fertility has direct, tangible effects on schools, roads, hospitals,
and the military service. The Berliner Zeitung
19 explains school closings because of
Germany’s low fertility: “For [the municipal education administrator] school planning
is a difficult job. For years, the number of students in his district has continually
decreased. The base of this trend is low fertility…” An earlier article in the same
paper quotes a representative of the Union for Education and Science regarding the
low fertility rates as saying, “In the upcoming school year, we’re expecting chaos.”
Other: A commonly cited consequence of low fertility is an aging population. Many
articles discuss longevity and aging as an issue complementary to low fertility.
However, in the analysis in this paper, aging is only tabulated as a consequence when
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it is explicitly framed as a consequence of low fertility. For instance, an article in
Japan’s Asahi Shimbun
20 makes the link explicit, “A low birth rate is accelerating the
aging of society…” In many countries there may also be a debate on population aging
that has no reference to low fertility, and these debates are not included in our search
strategy.
Across all countries, the implications of low fertility for the economy in general, the
labor force and the pension system are most prominently mentioned. Moreover, these
various economic consequences of low fertility are presented quite consistently across
all countries ranging from 32 percent in Japan to 83 percent in Switzerland. The
second most important consequence of low fertility in the public debate pertains to
national well-being, that is, to the non-economic implications of low fertility on the
size and composition of the future population. An outlier in that context is clearly the
debate in New Zealand, where as many as three out of four articles associate
implications for the national well-being with low fertility. Although at a lower level,
concern about the national well-being is also consistently present in the debates in
Australia, Austria and France, and it occurs more sporadically in the remaining
countries. The distribution of a country’s relative power in economic and political
terms, both domestically and internationally, features also regularly in the debates in
Australia, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Among these countries,
France has had a traditional concern about low fertility as compared to its neighboring
countries that is documented from the 19
th century onward. In Australia, on the other
hand, this concern seems in part be due by the relatively low fertility of Australians as
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compared to their South-Asian neighbors whose growing populations may exert
immigration pressure into Australia or reduce the relative political influence of
Australia in that area. With a more domestic focus, the political power distribution of
the UK being debated because of the shrinking number of Scots who retain the same
representation in parliament. Somewhat surprising in our study is the relative absence
of a debate about the implications of low fertility on the family structure. While the
demographic influence of low fertility on the structure and composition of families is
out of question from a scientific perspective (Wachter 1997), only a subset of national
debates in Austria, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK reflect this implication of low
fertility.
The above discussion of the perceived consequences of low fertility in the public
debate focused on the presence of certain arguments in the debate. In addition, we
also investigate whether a specific implication or consequence of low fertility is also
associated with an evaluation of the respective social and economic changes. Table 8
therefore tabulates the consequences of low fertility by the respective evaluation in
the debates. For most consequences, the evaluation seems to be relatively polarized.
The implications for the economy, labor force and pension system are
overwhelmingly perceived negatively, as are the consequences for national well-being
and power distribution. Quite strikingly, the only aspect where the consequences of
low fertility are seen overwhelmingly in a positive light is in the area of the ecological
environment. A more balanced evaluation between neutral and negative, but almost
never positive perspective, exists for the consequences for family structure, social
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structure and attitudes, and infrastructure. A mixed evaluation that includes both
positive and negative perspectives seems to exist in the assessment of low fertility
consequences for women, parents and families.
7. Interventions for low fertility in the popular debate
In light of the overall negative assessment of low fertility it is not surprising that
potential interventions are an important aspect in the public debate about low fertility.
On average nearly half of the articles on low fertility suggest specific interventions to
reduce the negative consequences associated with persistent below-replacement
fertility, ranging from 20 percent in the US to 86 percent in Spain (tables 9A and 9B).
These suggested interventions to accommodate or change low fertility in the public
debate fall into two primary categories:
Change low fertility: Five different types of interventions suggested ways to change
low fertility. Articles suggest raising fertility through more parent-friendly policies
from employers or the government, often in terms of time and money allocation;
limiting reproductive services, like access to contraceptives or abortion; returning to
traditional social values, often framed through the male-breadwinner paradigm;
exploring more progressive social values, like creating a shared-parenting norm and
new social resource models; and economic revitalization to boost national spirit or cut
the financial burden of children.31
One more extreme suggestion for limiting low fertility comes from The Southland
Times
21 (New Zealand): “Things can change; the challenge for Invercargill city is to
make policies to alter the demographic framework. Invercargill Mayor Tim Shadbolt
said the council had to be inventive in it’s approach such as offering rates relief for
people who produced more than six children. (stet) ‘We have to plan a major power
cut or ban television, it’s the only hope we’ve got.’”
Accommodate low fertility: The articles identified in our study also offered four
different resolutions to low-fertility problems without raising fertility. The resolutions
offered solutions to economic, pension, and workforce problems linked with having
fewer people. The resolutions included, changing immigration policies; encouraging
new workers like women, youth, or senior citizens in the workforce; changing career
structure, like the number of hours worked or the retirement age, to retain the same
workers with higher productivity; and making specific changes to the pension system.
Specific recommendations to accommodate low fertility suggested in Austria’s Die
Presse
22 included, “later retirement, continued job training, more private insurance,
and redistribution of government funds from younger cohorts to older.”
Tables 9A and 9B show that immigration and parent-friendly policies are most
consistently mentioned in that debate. Considerable variation, however, exists in the
prevalence of these arguments. While low fertility in Australia seems to be strongly
associated with a debate about immigration, the debate in New Zealand is much more
concerned with policy interventions that focus on the already resident population. A
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discussion of immigration as a potential reaction to persistent low fertility is also
relatively absent in Japan, and although about two thirds of all articles include policy
suggestions, these seem to focus on family policy and economic interventions. In
most other countries, family policies and immigration are represented parallel to each
other in the public debate about low fertility, and only a combination of internal and
external focus is perceived as being able to change and/or accommodate persistent
below replacement fertility. Other possibilities of the government to intervene in low
fertility situations are mentioned more sporadically. For instance, a revitalization of
the economy is mentioned to some extent in the debates in Australia, Austria, France,
Germany, Japan and Spain, while limiting reproductive health services, namely
restricting abortion, are discussed in New Zealand.
A second, less direct and less controllable intervention addresses the area of values
and social attitudes. However, the direction of these interventions diverge. One side of
the public debate about low fertility seems to suggest a return to more traditional
values and attitudes to rebuild the higher-fertility cultural contexts of the past. Still,
another side suggests the adoption of new and more progressive norms and values that
allow the combination of new child-rearing partnerships, different lifestyles
conducive to childbearing, and more contemporary parent roles.
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8. Patterns of concern over low fertility
Three case study countries—the US, Italy and New Zealand—exemplify common
patterns of concern about low fertility. Cultural and policy contexts are important for
understanding nuance, cross-country variation in concern over low fertility. However,
juxtaposing the level of concern in the popular press with demographic measures
helps explain the broad consistencies we found. These three patterns of concern
described below are also illustrated in Figure 1, which shows source countries’ overall
perspectives toward low fertility plotted against their total fertility rates.
Projected population growth in the next decades, little concern about low fertility: The
case of the United States
The US public lacks strong concern about low fertility since fertility levels are close
to replacement level. Concerns about the consequences of low fertility are thus
relatively rare, and the discussion tends to focus on other demographic trends instead.
This dearth of alarm about low fertility contrasts with academic concern over and
public awareness of a changing population distribution, namely aging, and its impacts
on the US social security system. By current projections, the cost of social security
benefits will exceed the revenues earmarked for the system after 2014. Lee (2000)
points out that problems with the American social security system “have been
prominent in news report”, and we suggest, these concerns supercede domestic low
fertility concerns in the public conscience and popular press. An active demographic
debate on aging may therefore be developing in the American popular press and
public conscience, however, our media search on low fertility did not pick it up since
the public discussion about aging was disregarded in this study unless it was explicitly
linked to low fertility.34
Furthermore, lack of concern over low fertility in the US may also be a function of
two fertility experiences. First, with a TFR of 2.06, policy allowing 900,000
documented immigrants per year, and population growth that is projected to continue
in the US at least through 2050 (Table 9), the US is not experiencing the social and
economic consequences of low fertility that countries with a TFR near 1 experience
more harshly. Second, the US is experiencing below replacement fertility among non-
Hispanic white, Asian, and American Indian sub-populations, while fertility is slightly
above replacement level among blacks (2.2) and at a TFR of 3.0 for Hispanics.
23 As a
result, low fertility is not a cross-cutting experience, and for most sub-populations
below replacement level fertility is a recent trend. This varying fertility of sub-groups
points to American diversity. As a traditional immigrant nation, there is little uniform
American culture defined in racial and ethnic terms that may need protection, as is
argued in other countries with a more ethnicity-based national identity. In summary,
aging, rather than low fertility, is associated with economic concerns resulting from
demographic changes in the US, and below replacement fertility currently does not
pose a “threat” to American culture and society because of its established tradition as
an immigrant country with substantial social and cultural heterogeneity.
Projected population decline in the next decades, strong concern about low fertility:
The case of Italy
Italy shares a similar pattern of concern about low fertility with other European
countries, particularly Spain. Though the nuances of the arguments vary, the essence
                                                
23 Population Reference Bureau, AmeriStat: http://www.ameristat.org/racethnic/fertility.htm35
of low fertility threatening the country—through policy struggles, cultural loss, and
economic decline—dominates public concern.
Low fertility elicits deep public concern throughout Europe because it hits the core of
two systems with strong popular attachments: social support policy and cultural
heritage. First, Italy has generous social systems, deemed both a cause of low fertility
and the most prominent striking point of low fertility. To manage low fertility, Italy
must change its demographic trends or substantially reverse or alter established social
programs (Golini 1998a, b). In addition, Italy is steeped in cultural tradition, well-
recognized for the importance of family connections, as reflected by the popular
attachments to la mamma. Cultural heritage is being transformed by the changing
structure of the family and the population distribution, as well as changing values
towards women, children, foreigners and the elderly.
The language used in the public debate about low fertility to suggest remedies for the
perceived negative consequences—both political and social—hangs with an
awareness of a fascist past in Italy and also Germany. Interventions to change low
fertility, rather than change policies to match demographics, dictate private behavior
to better the state and protect culture. Part of the public concern with low fertility in
Europe is that, because of her history, solutions do not come easy.  The cover story in
Germany’s Der Spiegel explores the historical meaning of low fertility in Italy:
“Similarly taboo as a targeted immigration policy, is an active population policy—it
arouses association with attempts of the Fascists. In 1927 Mussolini introduced a tax
in Italy for single men and paid a premium for marriages and births. The state, that
today reigns by consensus, has to be kept out of the bedroom.”36
Projected population growth in the next decades, strong concern about low fertility:
The case of New Zealand
New Zealand is characteristic of perhaps the most surprising cases. In the previous
two cases, when a country’s demographic variables are considered, its sentiments
towards low fertility follow logically. The inverse relationship between concern and
demographics—high growth, low concern and low growth, high concern—is
somewhat intuitive. However, another pattern of concern does exist, which does not
match this predictable inverse relationship between growth and concern.
Like the US, New Zealand’s population growth is strong, though its TFR of 1.8 dips
slightly below the US’s and replacement level. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s
population will not stabilize for at least another fifty years, by United Nations medium
variant projections. Based on its demographic indicators, we expected public
sentiment in New Zealand to be close to that in the US: with barely-below-
replacement fertility and continued net population growth, low fertility does not seem
to constitute a problem.
However, the New Zealand public has responded to the contrary, with more than 80
percent of the articles on low fertility giving a negative perspective, more than that of
both the US and Italy. New Zealand illustrates that concern towards low fertility is
relative to a country’s historical fertility levels and to the fertility levels of
neighboring countries.37
While slightly-below-replacement fertility has been relatively stable in the US, this is
a recent and somewhat sudden development in New Zealand, diverging from
historically above-replacement fertility. New Zealand’s alarmed reaction to slightly-
low fertility is reminiscent of France during the late 1960s and early ‘70s. While
France’s fertility was still above replacement level in 1967, the government was
nonetheless concerned about its downward trend and commissioned a study on ways
to increase fertility, namely the birth of a third child (United Nations 1989;
Teitelbaum and Winter1985). In addition, New Zealand’s fertility is strikingly low
relative to its developing neighbors. As reflected in the country’s articles, New
Zealand’s national-well being is threatened by low fertility, translating into a lack of
national vigor, while in terms of fertility, its neighbors in Southeast Asia thrive.
9. Discussion and concluding remarks
Our investigation into the public debate about low fertility in eleven developed
countries clearly reveals that the issue of low fertility, often representing social and
economic gains, conjures alarm among the popular press and the public. Though
below-replacement fertility rates have existed in many developed countries for
decades and public debates over low fertility periodically erupted in individual
countries and in different eras (see Teitelbaum and Winter 1985), broad speculation
over the consequences of contemporary low fertility has remained mainly an
academic concern. The reasons for the emergence of this recent low fertility debate
may be twofold. On one hand, below-replacement fertility rates did not result in net
population decline until recently due to population momentum, increasing life
expectancy, and immigration. On the other hand, only the last decade brought about
lowest low fertility levels on a national scale that are below 1.3 for prolonged periods38
of time. The direct implications of the contemporary low fertility rate—on public
policy, economics, and social identity—therefore had not touched the public because
again population momentum, mortality declines and immigration served as a buffer as
long as fertility was only modestly below replacement, pushing population growth
despite below replacement fertility rates. Since the most severe consequences of low
fertility were a subject of the future, the low fertility debate frequently remained
ostensibly academic. In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s, when below-replacement
fertility superceded the Baby Boom in many developed countries, low fertility was
seen as an antidote to fresh concerns about high fertility in many developed nations at
that time. Indeed, many countries in this study—including the US, Japan, Australia
and the UK—initiated research on the impact of domestic overpopulation during this
time (Gauthier 1996).
We find, in agreement with the United Nation’s Population Inquiry Survey conducted
among developed countries in 1989, that fertility levels alone are not the sole
determinant of how satisfied countries are with their demographic situations in recent
years. Instructed by the New Zealand case study and the other countries experiencing
slightly-below-replacement fertility at the same time as serious concern about low
fertility, we find that other demographics—namely net population growth or decline
as well as aging—along with social considerations—like attachment to an ethnically-
based national identity and value of traditional family structures and roles—play a
vital role in determining concern.
Undoubtedly, low fertility is a serious concern in the public view, as shown by the
volume and range of discussion as well as the negativity of most perspectives.39
Furthermore, the variety of issues and perspectives revealed in the public debate,
while cohesive in general ways, invites a role for demographers in informing an
accurate public discussion of low fertility, which will help form the most appropriate
policy outcomes. Starting with a discussion of how low contemporary fertility is,
including insight from both the adjustment of the total fertility rate and comparisons
of cohort and period fertility, to an informed evaluation of the connection between
socioeconomic conditions, family policies and fertility levels, there seems be a
considerable need for demographers to contribute to the public discussion on the
causes of low fertility. In addition, the strong emphasis on the consequences of low
fertility in the public debates provide a unique opportunity for demographers to
inform and shape a highly policy-relevant discussion about the social, economic and
political consequences of future population change. In particular, the role of
demographers in this discussion should extend beyond the provision of accurate
measurements of fertility and projections about future trends, to include an active
professional discussion on the consequences and potential remedies of the most recent
trends.40
Appendix A. Reuters Business Briefing Source Categorizations
Country Publication Language Text Type
Germany
Berlin Zeitung German National, Full-text
Boersen Zeitung English National, Abstract
Der Spiegel German National, Full-text




General Anzeiger German Regional, Abstract
Handelsblatt English National, Abstract
Passauer Neue Press German Regional, Full-text
Stuttgarter Zeitung German Regional, Full-text
Suddeutsch Zeitung German National, Full-text
TAZ German National, Full-text
Austria
Der Standard German National, Full-text
Die Presse German National, Full-text
Australia
Age (Melbourne) English Regional, Full-
text, Daily and
Sunday
Australian English National, Full-text
Australian Financial Review English National, Full-text
Canberra Times English Regional, Full-text
Courier Mail English Regional, Full-text
Daily Telegraph English National, Full-text
Herald Sun English Regional, Full-
text, Daily and
Sunday
Illawara Mercury English Regional, Full-text
The Mercury English Regional, Full-text
Sunday Mail Adelaide English Regional, Full-text
Sydney Morning Herald English Regional, Abstract
West Australian English Regional, Full-text
New Zealand
Christchurch Press English Regional, Full-text
Daily News English Regional, Full-text
Dominion English Regional, Full-text
Evening Post English Regional, Full-text




Nelson Mail English Regional, Full-text
New Zealand Herald English National, Full-text
Southland Times English Regional, Full-text
Timaru Herald English Regional, Full-text41
Waikato Times English Regional, Full-text
The United States
Chicago Tribune English National, Full-text
Los Angeles Times English National, Full-text
Washington Post English National, Full-text
Aberdeen American News English Regional, Abstract
Akron Beacon Journal English Regional, Abstract
Anchorage Daily News English Regional, Abstract
Appleton Post-Crescent English Regional, Abstract
Arizona Republic English Regional, Abstract




Augusta Chronicle English Regional, Abstract
Austin American-Statesman English Regional, Abstract
Bakersfield Californian English Regional, Abstract
Belleville News-Democrat English Regional, Abstract
Biloxi Sun Herald English Regional, Abstract
Boston Globe English Regional, Abstract
Boulder Daily Camera English Regional, Abstract
Bradenton Herald English Regional, Abstract
Cedar Rapids Gazette English Regional, Abstract
Centre Daily Times English Regional, Abstract
Charleston Gazette English Regional, Abstract
Charleston Post and Courier English Regional, Abstract




Columbus Ledger-Enquirer English Regional, Abstract
Commentary English National, Abstract
Contra Costa Times English Regional, Abstract
Daily Oklahoman English Regional, Abstract
Dallas Morning News English Regional, Abstract
Denver Post English Regional, Abstract
Detroit Free Press English Regional, Abstract
Duluth News-Tribune English Regional, Abstract
Eugene Register-Guard English Regional, Abstract
Florida Times Union English Regional, Abstract
Forbes English National, Abstract
Fort Wayne News-Sentinel English Regional, Abstract
Fort-Worth Star-Telegram English Regional, Abstract
Fresno Bee English Regional, Abstract
Gilroy Dispatch English Regional, Abstract
Grand Forks Herald English Regional, Abstract
Hackensack Record English Regional, Abstract
Harrisburg Patriot English Regional, Abstract
Herald Journal English Regional, Abstract
Houston Chronicle English Regional, Abstract42
Idaho Falls Post Register English Regional, Abstract
Indian Country Today English Regional, Abstract
Indianapolis Star English Regional, Abstract
Kansas City Star English Regional, Abstract
Lawrence Journal-World English Regional, Abstract
Lexington Herald Leader English Regional, Abstract
Long Beach Press-Telegram English Regional, Abstract
Maclean’s English National, Abstract
Macon Telegraph English Regional, Abstract
Miami Herald English Regional, Abstract
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel English Regional, Abstract
Modesto Bee English Regional, Abstract
Monterey County Herald English Regional, Abstract
Myrtle Beach Sun News English Regional, Abstract
National Review English National, Abstract
New York Daily News English Regional, Abstract
Newark Star-Ledger English Regional, Abstract
Newport News Daily Press English Regional, Abstract
Omaha World-Herald English Regional, Abstract
Orange County Register English Regional, Abstract




Philadelphia Daily News English Regional, Abstract
Philadelphia Inquirer English Regional, Abstract
Providence Journal Bulletin English Regional, Abstract
Pueblo Chieftain English Regional, Abstract
Richmond Times-Dispatch English Regional, Abstract
Roanoke Times English Regional, Abstract
Rock Hill Herald English Regional, Abstract
Sacramento Bee English Regional, Abstract
Saint Paul Pioneer Press English Regional, Abstract
Salt Lake Tribune English Regional, Abstract
San Antonio Express News English Regional, Abstract
San Jose Mercury News English Regional, Abstract
San Luis Obispo Telegram-
Tribune
English Regional, Abstract
Sante Fe New Mexican English Regional, Abstract
Seattle Times English Regional, Abstract
Sierra English National, Abstract
Spokane Spokesman Review English Regional, Abstract
St Louis Post-Dispatch English Regional, Abstract
St. Petersburg Times English Regional, Abstract
Tallahassee Democrat English Regional, Abstract
Tampa Tribune English Regional, Abstract
The Oregonian English Regional, Abstract
The State English Regional, Abstract
Times Leader English Regional, Abstract43
Tri-City Herald English Regional, Abstract
Tulsa World English Regional, Abstract
Virginia-Pilot English Regional, Abstract
Wichita Eagle English Regional, Abstract
Wisconsin State Journal English Regional, Abstract
The United Kingdom
Aberdeen Press and Journal English Regional, Full-text
Birmingham Post English Regional, Full-text
Cornish Guardian English Regional, Full-text
Daily Mail English National, Full-text
Daily Post English National, Full-text
Daily Telegraph English National, Full-text
Eastern Daily Press English Regional, Full-text
Economist English National, Full-text
Evening Standard English Regional, Full-text
Guardian English National, Full-text
Independent English National, Full-text
Manchester Evening News English Regional, Full-text
Mirror English National, Full-text
Northern Echo English Regional, Full-text
People English National, Full-text
Scotland on Sunday English National, Full-text
Scottish Daily Record English Regional, Full-text
Sunday Mail English Regional, Full-text
Sunday Telegraph English National, Full-text
Sunday Times English National, Full-text
The Scotsman English National, Full-text
Times English National, Full-text
Western Morning News English Regional, Full-text
Yorkshire Post English Regional, Full-text
Switzerland
Basler Zeitung German National, Full-text
CASH German National, Full-text
FACTS German National, Full-text
L’Agefi French National, Full-text
Neue Zuericher Zeitung German, English National, Full-text
(German) and
Abstract (English)
Tages Anzeiger German National, Full-text
Italy
Corriere della Sera Italian National, Full-text
Il Sole English National, Abstract
La Stampa Italian National, Full-text
France
L’AGEFI English National, Abstract
Le Figaro English National, Abstract
Le Monde French, English National, Full-text
(French) and44
Abstract (English)
Les Echos French, English National, Full-text
(French) and
Abstract (English)
Liberation French Regional, Full-text
Spain
ABC Spanish National, Full-text
Cinco Dias Spanish, English National, Full-text
(Spanish) and
Abstract (English)
El Mundo Spanish National, Full-text
El Pais Spanish, English National, Full-text
(Spanish) and
Abstract (English)
Expansion Spanish National, Full-text
Gaceta de los Negocios Spanish National, Full-text




Asahi Shimbun English National, Full-text
Daily Yomiuri English National, Full-text
Kyodo News English National, Full-text
Mainichi Daily News English National, Full-text
Nikkei Weekly English National, Full-text45
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Table 1. Government Views and Policies Towards Growth, Fertility and Immigration, 1999
Population Growth Fertility Immigration
View Policy View Policy View Policy
Australia Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
Austria Too low No intervention Too low Raise Too high Lower
France Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Too high Lower
Germany Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Too high Lower
Italy Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
Japan Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
New Zealand Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
Spain Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
Switzerland Satisfactory No intervention Too low No intervention Too high Lower
United Kingdom Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Lower
United States Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory No intervention Satisfactory Maintain
Based on the UN Population Policy Data Bank from Anatoly Zoubanov, “Population ageing and population decline:
government views and policies” October 2000.   51
Table 2. Articles Discussing Low Fertility
Number of Articles Articles per Source Articles per Sources Used
Australia 74 6.17 (5) 6.73 (5)
Austria 26 13.00 (3) 13.00 (3)
France 88 17.60 (2) 22.00(2)
Germany 34 3.78 (7) 4.25 (7)
Italy 63 21.00 (1) 31.50 (1)
Japan 39 7.80 (4) 7.80 (4)
New Zealand 11 1.00 (10) 2.20 (10)
Spain 36 5.14 (6) 5.14 (6)
Switzerland 9 2.25 (8) 3.00 (9)
United Kingdom 37 1.54 (9) 3.36 (8)
United States 20 0.21 (11) 1.82 (11)
     TOTAL 437 2.47 6.33
Note: Column rank in parenthesis
1Source: US Bureau of the Census, Mid-year 1999 projection52
Table 3. Distribution of Articles’ Overall Perspectives by Source Country
Positive (%) Neutral (%) Negative (%)
Australia 1 23 76 (4)
Austria 0 42 58 (9)
France 14 53 33 (11)
Germany 0 41 59 (8)
Italy 2 38 60 (7)
Japan 3 10 87 (1)
New Zealand 0 18 82 (2)
Spain 6 14 81 (3)
Switzerland 0 33 67 (6)
United Kingdom 5 22 73 (5)
United States 10 40 50 (10)
     AVERAGE 5 33 62
Notes: All articles were coded for overall perspective towards low fertility.
Column rank is in parenthesis.53




























Germany 2 91 3 11 8 5
I t a l y 43 8 9 35
Japan 4413 1 0 0 3 1 1 5 2 0
New Zealand 91
Spain 3 92 3
Switzerland 3 3 22
United Kingdom 1 35
United States 33 0
OTHER
Developed Countries 1 7 3 6 3 22 10 10
Minority Group 10 10
Other Countries 11 5 5
World 7 9 2 9 3 22 15 15
“Developed Countries” are articles that discuss these countries as one region. “Other Countries” are developed countries not included in the table that are discussed
individually in articles (i.e. Norway).54

























Australia 41 30 57 33 17 40 40 10 20
Austria 23 63 3 1 708 3 5 001 7
France 38 33 55 21 36 27 39 9 6
Germany 24 8 2 51 31 3 0 3 82 52 5
Italy 37 23 39 22 13 35 57 26 9
Japan 10 41 0 00 2 55 05 05 0 0
New Zealand 36 4 25 0 50 0 0 0 50
Spain 75 27 1 9 2 271 9 5 7 2 69
Switzerland 44 42 5 2 502 5 5 00 0
United Kingdom 30 11 45 18 18 9 45 18 9
United States 15 30 3 3 00 2 6 77
AVERAGE 35 153 42 22 18 29 40 13 12
Note: Articles could cite more than one cause of low fertility.55









Changing Role of Women 15 20 63 17
Economics 8 1 52 65 9
Contraceptive Knowledge 6 2 55 42 1
Family Policies 10 21 6 8 1
Cultural Attitudes 1 453 9 5 6
Financial Costs 5 0 18 82
Other 4 5 37 5856



































Australia 69 51 47 37 20 16 0 0 8 4 22
Austria 46 12 33 33 0 0 0 25 8 17 33
France 69 61 70 33 16 15 10 5 16 0 2
Germany 82 28 43 4 0 4 0 0 7 43 14
Italy 63 40 32 13 3 0 6 10 13 16 19
Japan 56 22 59 9 0 0 5 0 9 18 23
New Zealand 36 4 5 0 7 5 0000000
Spain 72 26 38 8 8 0 4 23 4 12 8
Switzerland 67 6 8 31 71 7 0 0 1 73 31 71 7
United Kingdom 76 28 57 7 18 18 0 11 4 7 18
United States 80 16 63 13 6 19 0 6 6 6 6
AVERAGE 67 294 52 21 11 9 4 7 13 11 14
Note: Articles could cite more than one consequence of low fertility57









Economy, Labor Force, Pension 34 3 15 82
National Well-being 14 3 7 90
Power Distribution 7 0 20 80
Ecological Environment 6 89 4 8
Women, Parents, Families 23 0 3 0 4 0
Family Structure 5 5 45 50
Social Structure, Attitudes 8 8 27 65
Infrastructure 7 3 25 72
Other 9 5 33 6358

















Australia 66 49 43 6 14 4 4 8
Austria 73 19 79 5 0 11 5 11
France 57 5 0 2 601 0 1 6 1 02
Germany 32 11 2 7 0009 2 7
Italy 44 2 8 3 6 04007
Japan 38 15 33 0 7 13 7 20
New Zealand 73 8 5 0 5 0 0000
Spain 86 31 32 0 3 6 10 10
Switzerland 78 7 14 0 0 14 0 14
United Kingdom 32 12 33 17 8 17 0 8
United States 20 42 50 02 50 0
AVERAGE 54 234 37 4 7 9 6 9
Note: Articles could cite more than one intervention to change low fertility59















Australia 66 4 9 8 0 0200
Austria 73 1 9 2 101 15 5
France 57 50 32 10 32 38 2
Germany 32 11 5 501 8 3 60
Italy 44 28 43 0 0 11 7
Japan 38 15 7 7 7 33 13
New Zealand 73 8 1 3 0000
Spain 86 31 32 10 19 16 6
Switzerland 78 7 43 14 14 29 14
United Kingdom 32 12 25 17 33 25 0
United States 20 42 505 0 2 50
AVERAGE 54 2 3 4 4 151 5 1 84
Note: Articles could suggest more than one intervention to accommodate low fertility.60
Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate by Percentage of Negative Articles
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